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RLUIPA AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING:  
GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE 
THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION 
IN EQUAL TERMS CASES 
Thomas E. Raccuia*
 
 
Zoning and other land use regulations are often used to hinder the 
operation of religious institutions or the construction of their facilities.  In 
2000, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act (RLUIPA), in part to combat such exclusionary land use 
practices.  RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision forbids governments from 
imposing land use regulations that treat religious institutions on less than 
equal terms with secular institutions.  Despite the apparent clarity of the 
statutory language, federal circuit courts have disagreed over the 
allocation of burdens of proof in Equal Terms cases.  Some circuits have 
held that religious plaintiffs have the burden of persuasion, while others 
have held that the burden of persuasion falls on government defendants.  
The allocation of burdens is important because it is generally more difficult 
for the party charged with the burden of persuasion to succeed at trial.  
This Note approaches the circuit split by examining RLUIPA’s legislative 
history and public policy goals, as well as comparing Equal Terms cases 
with federal exclusionary zoning cases, and with Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence.  Ultimately, this Note argues that in light of the above 
comparisons, as well as RLUIPA’s clear statutory text, the government, not 
the religious plaintiff, should have the burden of persuasion in Equal Terms 
cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2009, a group of American Muslims purchased the old Burlington 
Coat Factory building at 45 Park Place in Lower Manhattan, two blocks 
from the former World Trade Center site.1  The group’s plan to develop the 
building as a community center—which would include a prayer space, 
among other amenities2—attracted little media attention3 until May 2010, 
when Community Board 1 approved the project.4  Shortly thereafter, 
bloggers5 and newspaper columnists6 began to devote extensive coverage 
to the project, which would become widely known as the “Ground Zero 
Mosque.”7
In the months that followed, the project, by then titled Park51,
 
8 became a 
national controversy.  Despite vocal support for Park51 in some quarters,9 
by August, polls indicated that a majority of Americans were opposed to the 
plan.10
 
 1. See Ralph Blumenthal & Sharaf Mowjood, Muslim Prayers and Renewal Near 
Ground Zero, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2009, at A1 (noting that the building’s location, 
particularly its proximity to the World Trade Center, was an important factor for the buyers). 
  The controversy continued to grow during the 2010 midterm 
elections, and opposition to Park51 became a litmus test for some 
 2. See Anushay Hossain, Park 51:  The Ground Zero Mosque Is Not a Mosque, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 19, 2010, 12:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/anushay-
hossain/park-51-the-ground-zero-m_b_686950.html (noting that the community center 
would include a culinary school, auditorium, swimming pool, basketball court, and prayer 
space). 
 3. See Justin Elliott, How the “Ground Zero Mosque” Fear Mongering Began, SALON 
(Aug. 16, 2010, 7:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/08/16/ground_zero_mosque_origins/ 
(“[There were] no news articles on the mosque for five and a half months.”). 
 4. See NEW YORK, N.Y., Manhattan Community Board 1 Res. (May 25, 2010), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/mancb1/downloads/pdf/Resolutions/10-05-25.pdf 
(approving the project, entitled the Cordoba House Project). 
 5. See Pamela Geller, SIOA Campaign Offensive:  Stop the 911 Mosque!, ATLAS 
SHRUGS (May 7, 2010, 1:26 PM), http://atlasshrugs2000.typepad.com/atlas_shrugs/
2010/05/sioa-action-alert-stop-the-911-mosque.html (“[F]ight the grotesque plans to build a 
monster mosque on . . . hallowed ground.”). 
 6. See Dorothy Rabinowitz, Liberal Piety and the Memory of 9/11, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
4, 2010, at A15 (noting opposition to the project among New Yorkers). 
 7. See id. (“The enlightened class can’t understand why the public is uneasy about the 
Ground Zero mosque.”). 
 8. See Dan Amira, Ground Zero Mosque Gets Less Muslim-Invasion-Sounding Name, 
N.Y. MAG. (July 14, 2010, 10:05 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2010/07/ground_zero_
mosque_gets_lets_m.html (noting that developers dropped the original name, “Cordoba 
House,” which conjured images of the Moors’ conquest of Spain). 
 9. See, e.g., Rabinowitz, supra note 6 (noting Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s vocal 
support for Park51); Build That Mosque:  The Campaign Against the Proposed Cordoba 
Centre in New York Is Unjust and Dangerous, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2010, at 32 (criticizing 
Newt Gingrich’s and Sarah Palin’s vocal opposition to Park51). 
 10. See Celeste Katz, CNN Poll:  Nearly 70% of Americans Oppose NYC Mosque Plan, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 11, 2010, 12:40 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/
dailypolitics/2010/08/poll-nearly-70-of-americans-op.html (“[N]early 70 percent of all 
Americans oppose the controversial plan . . . while just 29 percent favor the construction.”); 
Mosque-Building and Its Discontents, ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2010, 1:59 PM), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/islamic_cultural_centre_
sorta_near_ground_zero (citing poll in which 57.9 percent of respondents indicated that 
Park51 should not be built). 
1856 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
conservative politicians and candidates.11  Republican New York 
gubernatorial candidate Carl Paladino promised to “stop the mosque,” and 
vowed to seize the property via eminent domain if necessary.12  His 
approach echoed earlier efforts to employ land use laws to halt the 
construction from moving forward; New York’s Landmarks Preservation 
Commission rejected demands to grant the Burlington Coat Factory 
building historical protection, which would have precluded development of 
the property.13
Although Park51 has by now largely disappeared from the national 
dialogue (at least compared with the hysteria of August 2010),
 
14 the 
controversy was an extreme manifestation of the difficulties religious 
institutions sometimes face when trying to find a home.15  Small or 
unpopular religious institutions, mosques in particular, often must 
overcome attempts to subject them to exclusionary zoning practices.16  The 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 200017 (RLUIPA) 
protects religious institutions from discriminatory land use regulation.18
RLUIPA forbids governments from implementing land use regulations 
that treat a “religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a 
    
 
 11. See Bobby Ghosh, Islam in America:  It’s Part of the Fabric of Life, but Protests 
Reveal a Growing Hostility to the Religion of Muslims, TIME, Aug. 30, 2010, at 22 (noting 
that Park51 is a “volatile political issue”). 
 12. See Celeste Katz, Carl Paladino Advertises on Ground Zero Mosque Issue, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 5, 2010, 4:17 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/
2010/08/carl-paladino-advertises-on-gr.html (noting a televised Paladino campaign ad that 
drew comparisons between Paladino’s opposition to Park51 and rival candidate Andew 
Cuomo’s support for the project).  Paladino would go on to lose the election to Cuomo. See 
Nicholas Confessore, Cuomo Cruises to Win in New York Governor’s Race, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/nyregion/03nygov.html. 
 13. See Javier C. Hernandez, Mosque near Ground Zero Clears Key Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 3, 2010, 12:45 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/mosque-near-
ground-zero-clears-key-hurdle/ (noting unanimous vote against granting historic protection). 
 14. See Justin Elliot, Whatever Happened to the “Ground Zero Mosque”?, SALON (Dec. 
31, 2010, 11:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/2010/12/31/park_51_a_look_back/singleton/ 
(noting the sudden disappearance of the Park51 controversy from the national conversation); 
Abbie Fentress Swanson, Park 51 Opens Renovated Space with Photo Exhibit of NYC 
Immigrant Children, WNYC CULTURE (Sept. 21, 2011), http://culture.wnyc.org/articles/
features/2011/sep/21/park-51-gallery-show/ (noting Park51’s quiet opening, and plans to 
continue the growth of the facility over several years). 
 15. See infra Part I.A.2. 
 16. See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
 17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2006). 
 18. This Note is not the first to recognize the possibility that the use of zoning 
regulations in opposition to Park51 would likely implicate RLUIPA.  Sean Foley, for 
example, while generally arguing for a narrow interpretation of RLUIPA, asserts that a 
rejection of Park51 by the city would have violated the Equal Terms Provision. See Sean 
Foley, Comment, RLUIPA’s Equal-Terms Provision’s Troubling Definition of Equal:  Why 
the Equal-Terms Provision Must Be Interpreted Narrowly, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 193, 194 
(2011) (“Had either local body rejected Park51, the city would have violated [RLUIPA].”).  
For an in-depth analysis of RLUIPA’s application to Park51, see generally Alex R. Whitted, 
Note, Park51 as a Case Study:  Testing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act, 45 IND. L. REV. 249 (2011) (analyzing hypothetical RLUIPA claims that might 
follow the New York City Department of City Planning’s rejection of Park51’s application 
for a building permit). 
2012] RLUIPA AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 1857 
nonreligious assembly or institution.”19  This clause is known as the “Equal 
Terms” provision.  RLUIPA was enacted just over a decade ago,20
 Specifically, the courts disagree over the allocation of burdens of proof
 but the 
federal courts of appeals have not yet produced a clear consensus as to the 
application of the Equal Terms Provision. 
21 
in challenges brought under the Equal Terms Provision.22  A few federal 
circuit courts have held that plaintiffs must prove that the challenged land 
use regulation treats them less than equally,23 while others have instead 
held that the burden of persuasion24 lies with the government.25  The 
allocation of burdens of proof is important because it is often outcome-
determinative; parties charged with the burden of persuasion are generally 
less likely to prevail.26
This Note approaches the circuit split by comparing the allocation of 
burdens of proof in Equal Terms cases with federal exclusionary zoning 
cases,
 
27 and with Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.28
Part I of this Note begins with a discussion of land use regulations and 
their exclusionary effects.  After a brief description of burdens of proof, it 
provides background information on RLUIPA and its enactment.  Finally, it 
surveys federal exclusionary zoning case law, and outlines Free Exercise 
jurisprudence.  Part II discusses the circuit split that has emerged as federal 
courts interpret the Equal Terms Provision.  Part III analyzes the relevance 
of exclusionary zoning cases and the Free Exercise Clause to interpreting 
RLUIPA, discusses public policy considerations.  This Note concludes that 
government defendants should be charged with the burden of persuasion in 
Equal Terms cases. 
  In light of these 
comparisons, as well as RLUIPA’s text and public policy concerns, this 
Note argues that in Equal Terms claims, the government, not the religious 
plaintiff, should have the burden of persuasion. 
I.  ZONING AND LAND USE LAWS, BURDENS OF PROOF, RLUIPA, 
EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CASE LAW, AND FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE 
This part begins by explaining the mechanics of zoning and land use 
laws, and outlines how such laws have historically been used to 
discriminate and exclude.  It then defines burdens of proof and explains the 
consequences of their allocation.  Next, it highlights the sections of 
RLUIPA that are relevant to this Note, and explores the history and intent 
of the statute.  Finally, this part surveys federal exclusionary zoning case 
 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(2)(b)(1). 
 20. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 21. See infra Part I.B. 
 22. See infra Part II. 
 23. See infra Parts II.B–II.C. 
 24. The “burden of persuasion” is a distinct aspect of the burden of proof.  See infra Part 
I.B for a more detailed explanation of burdens of proof. 
 25. See infra Parts II.A, II.D. 
 26. See infra Part I.B. 
 27. See infra Part I.D.1. 
 28. See infra Part I.D.2. 
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law, and traces the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise 
jurisprudence. 
A.  The Role of Zoning and Land Use Regulations 
RLUIPA is directed at all forms of land use regulation,29 which includes 
a broad array of techniques such as eminent domain,30 protection of 
landmarked buildings,31 and zoning.  Zoning is the primary focus of this 
Note because it is the land use device most frequently at issue in Equal 
Terms cases.32
1.  A Definition and Brief History of Zoning 
  This section defines zoning and then outlines its history, 
including its development into a tool for discrimination. 
Zoning is a mechanism that local governments use to create and 
designate districts in which compatible uses of property are allowed and 
incompatible uses are excluded.33  Zoning is an extension of the concept of 
public nuisance,34 which protects property owners from activities that 
interfere with the use and enjoyment of their property.35  The idea is that 
some uses of land are inherently injurious to other uses, and thus should be 
separated.  For example, a city might restrict one area to industrial land 
uses, another area to commercial land uses, and another to residential uses 
only.36
 
 29. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006) (“No government shall impose or implement a 
land use regulation.” (emphasis added)). 
 
 30. See PATRICIA E. SALKIN, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 17:1 (5th ed. 2011) (“Eminent 
domain permits the government to appropriate private property without the owner’s 
consent.”); see also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 31. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 27:6 (“[P]reservation commissions . . . [have] authority 
to designate landmarks . . . .  [T]he degree of protection in any given municipality will 
vary.”); see also supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 32. See infra Part II. 
 33. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 732 (1995) (“‘[O]nly 
compatible uses are allowed.’” (quoting D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 4.16 (5th ed. 
2003))).  In addition to the local zoning code, state laws might further limit specific types of 
land uses by, for example, placing restrictions on the location of adult-video stores or the 
issuance of liquor licenses. See James G. Dwyer, No Place for Children:  Addressing Urban 
Blight and Its Impact on Children Through Child Protection Law, Domestic Relations Law, 
and “Adult-Only” Residential Zoning, 62 ALA. L. REV. 887, 900 (2011) (“[L]aws further 
proscribe . . . activities that would otherwise fall within the category of permissible uses—
for example, adult-only retail stores.”); see also infra notes 235, 265–66, and accompanying 
text.   
 34. See David C. Keating, Exclusionary Zoning:  In Whose Interests Should the Police 
Power Be Exercised?, 23 REAL EST. L.J. 304, 304 (1995) (noting zoning’s roots as a 
legislative extension of the doctrine of public nuisance). 
 35. See 58 AM. JUR. 2D Nuisances § 34 (2011) (defining public nuisance as “conduct or 
omissions which offend, interfere with, or cause damage to the public . . . in a manner such 
as to endanger or injure the property . . . of a considerable number of persons” (citing New 
York ex rel. Spitzer v. Operation Rescue Nat’l, 273 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 2001))). 
 36. See Dwyer, supra note 33, at 900 (explaining that designating some land exclusively 
for industrial use and other land exclusively for residential use demonstrates a state’s power 
to restrict the use of private property).  Not all zoning plans restrict each zone to one use.  In 
a “cumulative” zoning code, for example, “higher uses” are permitted in all zones where 
“lower uses” are permitted, but “lower uses” are not permitted in areas zoned for “higher 
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Government regulation of land use dates back to medieval England,37 
and many cities in the United States had adopted laws similar to today’s 
zoning ordinances as early as the nineteenth century.38  The first modern 
comprehensive zoning code was enacted in New York City in 1916,39 and 
shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of zoning 
in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.40  Euclid held that zoning was a valid 
exercise of the state police power,41 and guaranteed cities in every state the 
right to engage in zoning for the health, safety, and welfare of the 
community.42  Since the Euclid decision, zoning has become ubiquitous; 
the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act of 1922 has been one of the most 
successful model statutes ever promulgated.43
One noteworthy feature of modern zoning is the conditional use permit.
 
44  
A city or town will typically utilize a conditional use permit when it wants 
to allow a particular use of land in a given zone, but only under certain 
circumstances.45  To ensure that any such conditions are met, the given land 
use will be permitted only pursuant to the issuance of a conditional use 
permit.46
 
uses.” See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371–72 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that noncumulative zoning ordinances over time became 
preferred over the early, cumulative zoning ordinances). 
  Ordinarily, the city’s zoning board of adjustment or another local 
administrative body is charged with approval of applications for, and 
 37. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 1:2 (“[C]ontrol of land use may date back to . . . 1066 
in Norman England.”). 
 38. See William A. Fischel, An Economic History of Zoning and a Cure for Its 
Exclusionary Effects, 41 URB. STUD. 317, 318 (2004) (“Many cities had ordinances with 
some zoning-like features in the 19th century.”). 
 39. See id. at 319 (“Had New York not been first, several other cities were poised to take 
the title.”); Josh Whitehead, Note, Using Disparate Impact Analysis to Strike Down 
Exclusionary Zoning Codes, 33 REAL EST. L.J. 359, 371–72 (2005) (explaining that New 
York enacted its zoning code in response to the construction of the thirty-six-floor Equitable 
Building two years earlier, which lacked setbacks and blocked sunlight from reaching the 
surrounding streets). 
 40. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 41. See id. at 390 (“We find no difficulty in sustaining restrictions of the kind thus far 
reviewed.”).  A state’s police power can be defined as “power in government which restrains 
individuals from transgressing the rights of others, and restrains them in their conduct so far 
as is necessary to protect the rights of all” or the “residual power of the state, comprising that 
portion of the sovereignty of the state not surrendered by the terms of the United States 
Constitution to the Federal Government.” See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 958–59 (3d 
ed. 1969). 
 42. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 2:22 (noting that courts in all states approved of zoning 
after Euclid); Whitehead, supra note 39, at 371 (“[M]unicipalities have the right to engage in 
comprehensive zoning for the general health, safety, and welfare.”). 
 43. See Fischel, supra note 38, at 324 (noting the powerful influence of the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act of 1922). 
 44. Conditional use permits are also variously referred to as “special exceptions,” 
“special permits,” “special use permits,” and the like. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 14:1 
(noting that the terms are all “qualitatively the same”). 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. (“[A]pproval is a condition precedent.”). 
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issuance of, conditional use permits.47  Today, almost every zoning code 
utilizes conditional use permits to some extent.48
2.  An Overview of Exclusionary Zoning 
 
Although the original goal and justification of zoning was purported to be 
the improvement of community health, safety, and welfare,49 land use laws 
have long been used as a tool for discrimination and exclusion.50  Examples 
of techniques that have been used to exclude racial minorities include 
racially explicit zoning,51 restrictive covenants,52 blockbusting,53 and 
redlining.54  The Supreme Court has held each of these techniques to 
violate either the Fourteenth Amendment or the Fair Housing Act;55
Deprived of the abovementioned tools, cities continued to engage in 
discriminatory and exclusionary zoning through the use of facially neutral 
criteria like minimum lot size, minimum floor area, aesthetic criteria like 
setback requirements, and forbidding multi-family housing.
 
nevertheless,  exclusionary zoning persists. 
56  Indeed, 
exclusionary zoning grew throughout the 1950s, ’60s,57 and ’70s.58  While 
the term “exclusionary zoning” is sometimes applied in reference only to 
ordinances tending to exclude racial minorities,59
 
 47. See id. (“Each is allowed only upon approval of a board of adjustment . . . .”). 
 it can also refer to the use 
 48. See id. (“Nearly all zoning ordinances make some use of special-permit 
procedures.”). 
 49. See supra text accompanying note 42. 
 50. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 22:1 (noting opposition among residents of Long 
Island in the 1920s to the influx of blacks, Catholics, and Jews from New York City). 
 51. See Whitehead, supra note 39, at 362–63 (noting a 1911 Baltimore ordinance that 
made it unlawful for black people to move into residences located on white blocks). 
 52. Restrictive covenants are conditions written into deeds barring the property owner 
from selling it to anyone who is not white. See id. at 364. 
 53. Blockbusting is the practice whereby real estate speculators induce white people to 
sell their homes below market price by instilling the fear that large numbers of minorities are 
moving into the neighborhood. See id. at 367–69. 
 54. Redlining refers to the practice of insurance companies refusing to insure, or 
insisting upon exorbitant rates to insure, property in areas of high minority concentration. 
See id. at 369–71. 
 55. See id. at 360 (“Over the years, the Supreme Court found all of these tools 
unconstitutional, per the Fourteen[th] Amendment and the Fair Housing Act.”). 
 56. See SALKIN, supra note 30, § 22:6 (noting the exclusionary effects of large lot 
zoning, setback requirements, and limitations on apartment construction); Fischel, supra 
note 38, at 330 (noting that zoning could be used as a tool “to reduce potential contact 
between races . . . by the facially neutral expedient of insisting on large lots and single 
family homes”). See generally Adam Gordon, Making Exclusionary Zoning Remedies Work:  
How Courts Applying Title VII Standards to Fair Housing Cases Have Misunderstood the 
Housing Market, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 437 (2006) (arguing that zoning, even absent any 
discriminatory intent, has generally led to an increase in the cost of housing, which has in 
turn resulted in the exclusion of minorities).  
 57. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 440 (“[T]he use of exclusionary zoning had greatly 
intensified in the 1950s and 1960s.”). 
 58. See Fischel, supra note 38, at 317–18 (“[D]uring the 1970s [zoning] became more 
generally exclusionary.”). 
 59. See Whitehead, supra note 39, at 371 (“[Z]oning codes . . . have eliminated the 
possibility of many people of color from living in the community.  This practice has been 
dubbed ‘exclusionary zoning.’”). 
2012] RLUIPA AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING 1861 
of zoning to exclude the poor,60 the elderly,61 disabled persons,62 mobile 
home owners,63 and religious organizations.64
RLUIPA’s legislative history documents numerous instances of 
exclusionary zoning in the religious context.
 
65  Examples include a city’s 
refusal to allow construction of a Mormon temple based on aesthetics,66 the 
suspension of a religious mission for the homeless because it was located 
on the second floor of a building without an elevator,67 the imposition of 
limits on occupancy and operational hours of religious services,68 and the 
practice of requiring churches to obtain conditional use permits.69
In addition to the congressional record, there is evidence indicating that 
exclusionary zoning is increasingly likely to affect mosques and other 
Islamic institutions.  Discrimination against Muslims is increasing across 
the United States,
 
70 and such discrimination has been expressed most 
intensely through opposition to the construction or expansion of mosques.71  
An August 2010 report in The New York Times documented vocal and 
widespread opposition to mosque construction across the country.72  
Opponents of the construction of mosques often cite zoning criteria to 
justify their opposition.73
B.  The Importance of Burdens of Proof 
 
This section provides an overview of the concept of burdens of proof, 
and explains the differences between each distinct burden.  It then explains 
 
 60. See Fischel, supra note 38, at 331. 
 61. See Michael Kling, Zoned Out:  Assisted-Living Facilities and Zoning, 10 ELDER 
L.J. 187, 200 (2002) (noting that zoning ordinances often push assisted living facilities for 
the elderly to the city’s outskirts, far from essential services and public transportation). 
 62. See BRIAN W. BLAESSER & ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, FEDERAL LAND USE LAW & 
LITIGATION § 9:20 (2011) (explaining the applicability of the Fair Housing Act to zoning 
ordinances which discriminate against the disabled).  For a further discussion of the Fair 
Housing Act, see infra Part I.D.1.b. 
 63. See Keating, supra note 34, at 314–19 (noting, for example, a Pennsylvania 
ordinance which permitted mobile homes only upon the issuance of a conditional use permit, 
and a Michigan ordinance restricting mobile homes to a designated mobile home park). 
 64. See infra text accompanying note 120. 
 65. See 146 CONG. REC. 14,283 (2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (characterizing land 
use regulations as “seemingly insurmountable barrier[s]” to the free exercise of religion). 
 66. See id. 
 67. See 146 CONG. REC. 14,285 (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. (“[T]wenty-two of the twenty-nine zoning codes in the northern suburbs of 
Chicago effectively exclude churches, unless they have a special use permit.”). 
 70. See Ghosh, supra note 11, at 23 (noting that hate speech against Muslims is growing 
and becoming an “accepted form of racism in America”). 
 71. See id. (noting that most heated anti-Muslim encounters involve mosques). 
 72. See Laurie Goodstein, Around Country, Mosque Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1 (noting mosque-construction controversies in New York, 
Tennessee, California, and Wisconsin). 
 73. See John Schwartz, Zoning Law Aside, Mosque Projects Face Battles, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 4, 2010, at A11 (“Opponents of new mosque construction often cite factors other than 
religion, like parking and traffic.”). 
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the importance of the allocation of burdens of proof to the outcomes of 
cases. 
The general term “burden of proof” encompasses two related, but 
distinct, responsibilities—the burden of production, and the burden of 
persuasion.74  The burden of production does not require a party to prove 
his claim; he must merely bring forth evidence to support particular 
propositions that are necessary to his claim.75  In other words, the burden of 
production does not require a party to convince a jury that he is correct, but 
merely to produce enough evidence that a reasonable jury could find in his 
favor.76  Satisfaction of the burden of production is often referred to as 
making a “prima facie case.”77
The burden of persuasion, by contrast, is a higher standard.  In most civil 
actions, it requires a party to establish the truth of a given proposition
 
78 by a 
preponderance of the evidence.79  A party with this burden bears the 
ultimate risk of non-persuasion;80 in other words, he prevails only if he 
convinces the fact-finder that he is correct.81
In most cases, the burdens of production and persuasion will fall on the 
same party:  the plaintiff.
 
82  In some cases, however, once the party charged 
with the burden of production establishes a prima facie case, the burden of 
persuasion shifts to the opposing party.83  Due to the comparative ease of 
satisfying a burden of production as opposed to a burden of persuasion, the 
allocation of burdens will often be dispositive of the outcome of a given 
case.84  Generally, it is more difficult for the party charged with the burden 
of persuasion to prevail.85
 
 74. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 171 (2011). 
 
 75. See Hurley v. Hurley, 754 A.2d 1283, 1286 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000) (“A burden of 
production tells the court which party must come forward with evidence to support a 
particular proposition.”). 
 76. See 21B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122 
(2d ed. 2005) (“The burden of production . . . refers to the obligation of the party to produce 
enough evidence at trial to justify sending the case to the jury.”). 
 77. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 171 (2011). 
 78. See BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 161 (3d ed. 1969). 
 79. See 21B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 76, § 5122.  A preponderance of the evidence is 
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all 
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue 
rather than the other.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009).   
 80. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 79, at 223. 
 81. See 21B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 76, § 5122 n.39 (“A burden of persuasion is a 
requirement that a party convince the finder of fact . . . of the truth of an issue.”). 
 82. See id. § 5122. 
 83. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (explaining 
that once the plaintiff in an employment discrimination case establishes a prima facie case, 
the burden shifts to the employer to prove a nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment decision). 
 84. See 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 191 (2011) (“[W]here the burden of proof lies . . . is 
rarely without consequence.”). 
 85. See id. § 190 (“[I]f evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of 
persuasion must lose.”). 
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C.  The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
This section begins by summarizing RLUIPA’s legislative history, as 
well as the purposes and policy goals of the statute.  It then outlines the two 
major land use sections of the statute, the Substantial Burden Provision and 
the Equal Terms Provision.  Finally, this section addresses RLUIPA’s 
textual allocation of burdens of proof, as well as the statute’s internal 
guidelines for interpretation. 
1.  The History of RLUIPA’s Enactment 
RLUIPA was the final result of a long battle between Congress and the 
Supreme Court, which began with the Court’s holding in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith.86  In Smith, the Court 
held that neutral laws, even those whose application infringes on religious 
liberty, would be subject only to rational basis review.87  The Smith 
decision proved unpopular,88 and Congress attempted to “overrule” it via 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199389
The Supreme Court struck down RFRA shortly after its enactment in City 
of Boerne v. Flores.
 (RFRA). 
90  The Court explained that RFRA was too broad, and 
exceeded Congress’s authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment91 to enact remedial legislation.92
 
 86. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see infra notes 
  The practical consequence of 
Boerne was that Congress’s Section 5 power to enact remedial legislation 
189–97 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Sarah Keeton Campbell, Note, Restoring RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 58 
DUKE L.J. 1071, 1077 (2009) (“Under Smith, neutral and generally applicable laws must 
only survive rational basis review even if religious liberties were infringed . . . .”). 
 88. See id. (“[R]esponse to Smith was swift, direct, and overwhelmingly bipartisan.”). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 90. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“Broad as the power of Congress is under the 
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles 
necessary to maintain separation of powers . . . .”).  RFRA still applies to the federal 
government; Boerne invalidated it only as applied to the states. See Campbell, supra note 87, 
at 1078 n.34. 
 91. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the “power to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation,” the other provisions of the amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 5.  RLUIPA, by contrast, has survived challenges that it violated Congress’s Section 
5 powers. See 10 ROBERT L. HAIG, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL 
COURTS § 110:42 (3d ed. 2011) (noting that almost every federal court that has considered 
RLUIPA’s land use provisions has upheld them); 2 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, ZONING & 
PLANNING DESKBOOK § 7:46 (2d ed. 2011) (noting that the Eleventh Circuit upheld RLUIPA 
against claims that Congress lacked power under Section 5 to enact it (citing Midrash 
Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004))); Matthew Chandler, 
Comment, Moral Mandate or Personal Preference?  Possible Avenues for Accommodation 
of Civil Servants Morally Opposed to Facilitating Same-Sex Marriage, 2011 BYU L. REV. 
1625, 1639 (2011) (explaining that RLUIPA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power under 
the Commerce and Spending Clauses). But see Caroline R. Adams, Note, The Constitutional 
Validity of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000:  Will 
RLUIPA’s Strict Scrutiny Survive the Supreme Court’s Strict Scrutiny?, 70 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2361, 2393–2403 (2002) (arguing that RLUIPA exceeds Congress’s Section 5 power). 
 92. See Anthony L. Minervini, Comment, Freedom from Religion:  RLUIPA, Religious 
Freedom, and Representative Democracy on Trial, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 571, 581 (2010) 
(“The Court held that Congress had exceeded its remedial power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”). 
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was limited to the extent that such legislation must be proportional to 
specific, widespread, and documented discrimination.93
Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, RLUIPA in September 
2000.
 
94  RLUIPA was enacted to replace RFRA,95 and Congress wrote it 
narrowly to address two areas in which a record of widespread 
discrimination could be demonstrated:  religious land use, and the religious 
exercise of institutionalized persons.96  Since RLUIPA’s enactment, it has 
consistently survived constitutional challenges.97
There is ample evidence that RLUIPA’s intent was not only to replace 
RFRA, but to codify the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence as articulated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. 
City of Hialeah.
 
98  Much of that evidence can be found in RLUIPA’s 
legislative history.99  Courts interpreting RLUIPA have also widely 
acknowledged the congressional intent to codify Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence.100
Congress was also concerned with protecting minority or “unpopular” 
religions,
 
101 which are more likely to be subjected to discriminatory land 
use regulations.102  Commentators103 and at least one court104
 
 93. See Campbell, supra note 
 have also 
87, at 1079 (“[I]f Congress wishes to protect religious 
liberty by regulating the states pursuant to its Section 5 power . . . it must ensure that the 
legislation is a congruent and proportional response to widespread discrimination.”). 
 94. See David G. Savage & Richard Simon, U.S. Restores Special Protections for 
Religious Groups, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2000, at A18 (“President Clinton signed into law 
Friday a bill designed to restore strong legal protections for religious freedom when conflicts 
arise with cities [and] zoning boards . . . .”). 
 95. See Minervini, supra note 92, at 582 (“In response to . . . Boerne, Congress drafted 
[RLUIPA].”).  It is worth noting that prior to RLUIPA, religious land use plaintiffs were 
almost universally unsuccessful, in both constitutional challenges and under RFRA. See 
Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2178, 
2183 (2007) (noting that religious plaintiffs were consistently unsuccessful). 
 96. See Campbell, supra note 87, at 1080–82 (outlining the Congressional record 
documenting widespread religious discrimination in local land use laws).  RLUIPA’s effects 
on institutionalized persons are outside the scope of this Note. 
 97. See James C. Dunkelberger, Note, Missed Opportunity or Dodged Bullet?  The 
Tenth Circuit’s Non-decision in Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Board of County 
Commissioners., 2011 BYU L. REV. 99, 111 n.80 (2011) (noting that federal courts have 
overwhelmingly affirmed RLUIPA’s constitutionality).  
 98. 508 U.S. 520 (1993); see infra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
 99. See 146 CONG. REC. 16,699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy 
on the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) (“[T]he land use 
sections of the bill . . . enforce the Free Exercise . . . Clause[] as interpreted by the Supreme 
Court.”); 146 CONG. REC. 16,622 (statement of Rep. Canady) (“The Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act is a bill designed to protect the free exercise of religion.”); 
Statement by President William J. Clinton upon Signing S. 2869, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. 
DOC. 2168 (Sept. 22, 2000) (“[RLUIPA] recognizes the importance the free exercise of 
religion plays in our democratic society.”). 
 100. See infra notes 222, 229 and accompanying text. 
 101. See 146 CONG. REC. 16,698 (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy on the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) (“[N]ew, small, or unfamiliar 
churches in particular, are frequently discriminated against.”); see also Minervini, supra note 
92, at 572 (“Religious liberty is a bedrock principle of our national heritage.”). 
 102. See 146 CONG. REC. 14,283–84 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (noting a city’s refusal to 
allow construction of a Mormon temple); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public 
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recognized this motivation.  Plaintiffs in RLUIPA cases are often either 
religions that are small and obscure,105 or historically subject to 
discrimination,106 and recent evidence suggests that local zoning and land 
use controls often facilitate opposition to the construction of mosques.107
2.  An Overview of RLUIPA’s Substantial Burden 
and Equal Terms Provisions 
 
RLUIPA restricts land use regulations in two principal ways.  First, 
RLUIPA forbids governments from imposing or implementing land use 
regulations108 in a manner that “imposes a substantial burden on the 
religious exercise of . . . a religious assembly or institution.”109  This is 
generally referred to as the Substantial Burden Provision.110  Second, 
RLUIPA forbids governments from imposing or implementing land use 
regulations in “a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on 
less than equal terms with a nonreligious assembly or institution.”111
 
Good:  The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 
IND. L.J. 311, 346 (2003) (noting that the legislative history of the Religious Liberty 
Protection Act—an RLUIPA precursor that never passed—cites a Brigham Young 
University study that identified zoning criteria as a pretext for discrimination against 
“minority” churches). 
  This 
is generally referred to as the Equal Terms Provision. 
 103. See Lora Lucero, Knowing RLUIPA More Important as Communities Get More 
Diverse, PROF. DEV. INST. (Oct. 21, 2010, 3:14 PM), http://rutgerspdi.blogspot.com/2010/10/
knowing-rluipa-more-important-as.html (describing RLUIPA as a shield protecting minority 
religions); Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, supra note 95, at 2198 
n.131 (recognizing a congressional desire to prevent minority religions from becoming 
disadvantaged). 
 104. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1236 (11th Cir. 
2004) (“RLUIPA targets zoning codes which . . . exclude churches, especially ‘new, small or 
unfamiliar churches . . . [like] black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues.’” (alteration 
in original) (quoting 146 Cong. Rec. 16,698)). 
 105. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 368 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that the plaintiff was a church composed of only sixty-seven members). 
 106. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1221 (noting that the plaintiffs were two Orthodox 
synagogues). 
 107. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Whitted, supra note 18, at 271 (“RLUIPA’s broad definition of ‘religious 
exercise’ allows for the assumption that every religious entity has certain values or beliefs 
that must be expressed or symbolized through land use.” (citing Rocky Mountain Christian 
Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1171–72 (D. Colo. 2009))). 
 109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). 
 110. See generally Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the County’s denial of a conditional use permit to build a Sikh 
temple substantially burdened the plaintiff’s religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA).  
Although courts have used the Substantial Burden Provision for comparative purposes when 
interpreting the Equal Terms Provision, see, e.g., Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. 
City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 262–64 (3d Cir. 2007), the Substantial Burden Provision 
is outside the scope of this Note’s inquiry. 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
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3.  Interpreting RLUIPA:  Allocation of the Burden of Persuasion and Rules 
of Construction 
RLUIPA’s text specifically addresses burdens of proof.  The fourth main 
section of RLUIPA is titled “Judicial Relief.”112  Among other things, it 
establishes a private right of action under RLUIPA,113 and allocates 
burdens of proof.114  Section 2000cc-2(b), titled “Burden of Persuasion,” 
states that if the plaintiff produces a prima facie case alleging a violation of 
section 2000cc, the government has the burden of persuasion, except that 
the burden is on the plaintiff in claims under the Substantial Burden 
Provision.115  The Equal Terms Provision is part of section 2000cc.116
Section 2000cc-3 of RLUIPA, titled “Rules of Construction,” explains 
how the statute should be interpreted.
   
117  Section 2000cc-3(g) reads:  “This 
chapter shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious 
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and 
the Constitution.”118
D.  Two Models for Comparison:  Exclusionary Zoning 
and the Free Exercise Clause 
 
This section introduces two lines of case law that offer persuasive models 
for comparison with claims under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision:  (1) 
challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances, and (2) claims under the Free 
Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.119
Each line of cases has its own unique parallels to Equal Terms cases.  
Challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances are an apt comparison to 
challenges under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision because laws 
challenged under the Equal Terms Provision can be understood as examples 
of exclusionary zoning.
 
120
 
 112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2. 
  Both involve government regulations that work 
to exclude classes of people from the use and enjoyment of land in 
particular areas.  Because of the fundamental Due Process principle that 
 113. See id. § 2000cc-2(a) (“A person may assert a violation of this [Act] . . . and obtain 
appropriate relief against [the] government.”). 
 114. See id. § 2000cc-2(b) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a 
claim alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this 
title, the government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except 
that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a 
regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the 
plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”). 
 115. See id.   
 116. See id. § 2000cc(b)(1).  This Note ultimately concludes that RLUIPA’s text places 
the burden of production on religious plaintiffs, and the ultimate burden of persuasion on the 
government. See infra notes 262–63, 309–10 and accompanying text.  Despite the apparent 
clarity of the language in section 2000cc-2(b), at least two federal circuits have interpreted it 
otherwise. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3. 
 118. Id. § 2000cc-3(g). 
 119. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 120. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text. 
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“persons similarly situated should be treated alike,”121 it is reasonable to 
expect at least some consistency in all types of exclusionary zoning cases.  
Free Exercise claims provide a relevant model for comparison because it is 
often maintained that RLUIPA was intended to codify Free Exercise Clause 
jurisprudence.122
1.  A Survey of Federal Exclusionary Zoning Jurisprudence 
 
Federal courts rarely hear challenges to zoning ordinances.123  Two 
factors contribute to the scarcity:  the power to zone belongs to the states,124 
and strict standing requirements make it difficult for plaintiffs to bring their 
claims in federal courts.125  Nevertheless, federal courts have occasionally 
addressed exclusionary zoning, and because land use law varies widely by 
state,126 this Note exclusively addresses federal cases.  Specifically, this 
section will explore the allocation of burdens of proof in two types of such 
cases:  Equal Protection challenges,127 and discrimination claims brought 
under the federal Fair Housing Act128
a.  Equal Protection Challenges to Exclusionary Zoning Practices 
 (FHA). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”129  This provision 
provides a mechanism for challenging discriminatory government action.130  
As explained below, the mechanics of Equal Protection challenges depend 
upon the type of discrimination alleged and the plaintiff’s identity.131
 
 121. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (citing Plyer v. 
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). 
 
 122. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 123. See Keating, supra note 34, at 306 (noting the scarcity of federal exclusionary 
zoning case law).  State courts are far less deferential to the decisions of local zoning boards 
than federal courts. See 4 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER ET AL., RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND 
PLANNING § 67:3 (4th ed. 2011) (noting that state court judges have greater overall 
familiarity with zoning law and legislation than do federal judges); 2 KMIEC, supra note 91, 
§ 7:11 (noting state courts’ application of stricter standards of review than the rational basis 
test typical of federal courts in zoning cases, and that “the landowner has a better chance of 
having the zoning invalidated” in state court). 
 124. See Keating, supra note 34, at 304 (explaining that zoning is a state police power). 
 125. See id. at 306 (noting that to establish standing in federal court, a plaintiff must show 
that he has been personally excluded from a locality, and that a favorable ruling would allow 
him to live there). 
 126. See Hamilton, supra note 102, at 337 (“[E]ach state has . . . develop[ed] its own land 
use jurisprudence . . . .”). 
 127. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 128. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006). 
 129. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 130. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 668 (3d 
ed. 2006) (“[T]he Supreme Court has relied on the Equal Protection Clause as a key 
provision for combating invidious discrimination and for safeguarding fundamental rights.”). 
 131. See id. at 670 (“Equal protection analysis always must begin by identifying how the 
government is distinguishing among people.”). 
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Justice Byron R. White’s majority opinion in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center132 demonstrates that in Equal Protection challenges 
to exclusionary zoning ordinances, burdens of proof are dependent upon the 
plaintiff’s identity.133  The case arose when the city of Cleburne, Texas, 
denied the Cleburne Living Center’s request for a conditional use permit134 
to operate a group home for the mentally retarded.135  CLC filed suit 
alleging that the denial violated the Equal Protection Clause.136
Justice White’s opinion summarized of the Court’s Equal Protection 
jurisprudence.
 
137  He explained that ordinarily, legislation is presumed 
valid and will be sustained unless the challenger can prove that the 
distinction made by the statute is not rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.138  Under rational basis review, the plaintiff always 
has the burden of persuasion.139  However, if a statute makes a distinction 
based on certain suspect classifications,140 strict scrutiny applies, and the 
burden of persuasion shifts to the government to prove that the statute is 
suitably tailored to serve a compelling government interest.141  In Cleburne, 
the Court ultimately declined to recognize the mentally retarded as a 
suspect or quasi-suspect class,142 but nevertheless invalidated the zoning 
ordinance because there was no rational basis to conclude that the home 
would pose a threat to any of the city’s legitimate interests.143
The burden of persuasion’s relationship to the plaintiff’s identity in Equal 
Protection claims is also demonstrated in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas.
 
144  In Belle Terre, the Supreme Court rejected an Equal Protection 
challenge to a zoning ordinance that forbade more than two unrelated 
persons from living together.145
 
 132. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
  A homeowner in Belle Terre, New York, 
 133. This is not unique to zoning cases; it is true of all claims under the Equal Protection 
Clause. See infra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 134. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436 n.3 (noting that the zoning ordinance permitted 
hospitals and nursing homes as of right, but required a permit for hospitals for the “feeble-
minded”); see also supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 135. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435. 
 136. See id. at 437. 
 137. See id. at 439–42. 
 138. See id. at 440. 
 139. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 672 (“The rational basis test is enormously 
deferential to the government, and only rarely have laws been declared unconstitutional for 
failing to meet this level of review.”). 
 140. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (“The general rule gives way, however, when a 
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin.”).  An intermediate level of scrutiny 
applies to classifications based on gender.  The government bears the burden of proving that 
such classifications are “substantially related to a sufficiently important governmental 
interest.” Id. at 441. 
 141. See id. at 440. 
 142. See id. at 442 (“[W]e conclude for several reasons that the Court of Appeals erred in 
holding mental retardation a quasi-suspect classification . . . .”). 
 143. See id. at 448. 
 144. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 145. See id. at 9–10.  The ordinance restricted land use to single-family dwellings, and 
defined “family” to exclude groups in excess of two people not related by blood, adoption, 
or marriage. See id. at 2. 
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who had leased his house to six college students, was served with a notice 
to remedy his violation of the zoning ordinance.146  The homeowner (and 
three of his tenants) then brought suit against the Village, seeking an 
injunction and a declaration that the ordinance was unconstitutional.147
Justice William O. Douglas’s majority opinion upholding the ordinance 
did not specifically address burdens of proof, but his invocation of rational 
basis review
 
148 indicates that the burden of persuasion was on the 
plaintiffs.149  Because the plaintiffs failed to persuade the court that the 
ordinance did not have a rational relationship to a permissible state 
objective, the ordinance was upheld.150
b.  Challenges to Zoning Ordinances Claiming Racial Discrimination 
Under the Fair Housing Act 
 
Unlike zoning ordinances that exclude religious institutions,151 
ordinances that explicitly make distinctions based on race are 
unconstitutional.  The Supreme Court expressly invalidated such laws in 
Buchanan v. Warley.152  Nevertheless, after Buchanan, municipalities 
continued to engage in racially exclusionary zoning153 via facially neutral 
ordinances.154  Facially neutral laws that have a discriminatory effect are 
generally upheld absent evidence of discriminatory intent.155  As a result, 
constitutional challenges to such ordinances have generally been 
unsuccessful.156
 
 146. See id. at 2–3. 
 
 147. See id. at 3. 
 148. See id. at 8 (explaining that there is no Equal Protection violation if the law is 
“reasonable, not arbitrary” (quoting F.S. Royster Guano, Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920))). 
 149. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text. 
 150. See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 8–10 (explaining that the police power is not limited to 
issues of health or cleanliness, and that concerns about noise and traffic were legitimate state 
objectives). 
 151. Under certain circumstances, a zoning ordinance may exclude religious institutions 
without running afoul of either the constitution or RLUIPA. See supra notes 234–36 and 
accompanying text. 
 152. See 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917) (holding zoning ordinance forbidding black people from 
living on a “white block” a direct violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).  Not surprisingly, 
Buchanan resulted in the decline of such racially explicit ordinances, or at least their 
enforcement. See Whitehead, supra note 39, at 363 (noting that the Buchanan decision put 
an end to the enforcement of neighborhood segregation, if not segregation itself, which 
continued with “increasing ferocity”); see also supra notes 51, 55 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 440 (noting an increase in exclusionary zoning in the 
1950s and 1960s). 
 154. See Whitehead, supra note 39, at 373 (noting that exclusionary zoning ordinances 
generally are not facially discriminatory). 
 155. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“[O]ur cases have not 
embraced the proposition that a law . . . is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially 
disproportionate impact.”). 
 156. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 441 (“The Equal Protection Clause is . . . useless for 
most exclusionary zoning challenges . . . .”). 
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However, plaintiffs have brought successful exclusionary zoning claims 
under the federal Fair Housing Act.157  The FHA does not expressly forbid 
the enactment of exclusionary zoning ordinances, but ordinances that are 
passed with a discriminatory intent have nonetheless been held to violate 
section 3604(a)158 of the Act.159  Intent is notoriously difficult to prove, so 
such cases are rare.160  Most successful challenges operate under a disparate 
impact theory—every circuit except for the District of Columbia has 
recognized disparate impact claims under the FHA.161  The two most 
influential disparate impact cases have been Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights 
II)162 and Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington.163
The Arlington Heights II saga began when the City of Arlington Heights, 
Illinois
 
164 denied the Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation’s 
(MHDC) petition to rezone property on which it wished to construct low 
and moderate income housing.165
 
 157. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2006).  The FHA is also known as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968. See Whitehead, supra note 
  MHDC and three black individuals filed 
39, at 360. 
 158. Section 3604(a) reads, in pertinent part, “[I]t shall be unlawful to . . . make 
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). 
 159. See Whitehead, supra note 39, at 373 (“If a court finds any indication that a 
discriminatory intent exists . . . it will find the ordinance unlawful under the Fair Housing 
Act.”). 
 160. See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights (Arlington Heights II), 
558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (“‘Intent, motive, and purpose are elusive subjective 
concepts.’” (quoting Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972))); 
Whitehead, supra note 39, at 373 (“[O]ften the intent of a governing body is quite difficult to 
detect.”). 
 161. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 446 (citing Simms v. First Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 
1546, 1555 (5th Cir. 1996); Mountain Side Mobile Home Estates P’ship v. HUD, 56 F.3d 
1243, 1250–51 (10th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 
1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); United States 
v. Starrett City Assocs., 840 F.2d 1096, 1100 (2d Cir. 1988); Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 
482–84 (9th Cir. 1988); Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574–75 (6th Cir. 1986); 
Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1982); Resident Advisory Bd. v. 
Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147–48 (3d Cir. 1977); Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290; United 
States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184–85 (8th Cir. 1974)).  The Supreme Court 
recently granted certiorari to determine whether disparate impact claims are cognizable 
under the FHA. See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 548 (2011); Magner v. Gallagher, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/magner-v-gallagher/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter SCOTUSBLOG] 
(noting that the Court will decide whether a lawsuit can be brought for a violation of the 
FHA based on a practice that is not discriminatory on its own, but has a discriminatory 
effect).  The Court heard oral arguments on February 29, 2012. See SCOTUSBLOG, supra. 
 162. 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977). 
 163. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 164. At the time, Arlington Heights’s population was overwhelmingly white. See 
Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1286–87 (noting that in 1970, only 27 of Arlington 
Heights’ 64,884 residents were black).  Not much has changed; as of the 2010 Census, 
Arlington Heights’s population is 88.2 percent white and only 1.3 percent black. See 
Arlington Heights (village), Illinois, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/17/
1702154.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012). 
 165. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1286 (“[T]he Village Board of Trustees voted 
to deny the petition.”).  The property was restricted to single-family homes. See id. 
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suit in federal court alleging that the denial was racially discriminatory, 
claiming violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the FHA.166
Reading FHA section 3604(a)’s “because of race”
 
167 language broadly, 
the Seventh Circuit concluded that a zoning policy could violate the FHA 
even without discriminatory intent.168  The court explained that section 
3604(a) is violated when, even without discriminatory intent, the defendant 
engages in conduct for which the “natural and foreseeable” consequence is 
to discriminate based on race.169
The court noted, however, that a mere showing of discriminatory effects 
does not prove a violation of the FHA
 
170—it merely establishes a prima 
facie case.171  Having found that the Village Board of Trustees’ denial of 
MHDC’s petition to rezone had a disparate impact on black people,172 the 
court articulated a four-factor balancing test to determine whether the FHA 
had been violated:  (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of 
discriminatory effects, (2) evidence of discriminatory intent, (3) the 
defendant’s interest in taking the challenged action, and (4) whether the 
plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to provide housing or merely stop 
the defendant from preventing property owners from providing housing.173  
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit considered the four factors, determined that 
it was “a close case,” and remanded to the district court to determine 
whether the FHA had been violated.174
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit’s balancing test, the Second Circuit 
held in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington
 
175
 
 166. See id.  The case would eventually reach the Supreme Court, which found no Equal 
Protection violation, and remanded it to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether there was 
a violation under the FHA. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. 
(Arlington Heights I), 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977). 
 that once a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case of disparate impact, the burden 
 167. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1290 (“We cannot agree that Congress in 
enacting the Fair Housing Act intended to permit municipalities to systematically deprive 
minorities of housing opportunities simply because those municipalities act discreetly.”). 
 169. See id. at 1288. 
 170. See id. at 1290 (“[W]e refuse to conclude that every action which produces 
discriminatory effects is illegal.”). 
 171. See Gordon, supra note 56, at 444 (“[T]he Arlington Heights II court then turned to 
possible avenues for the municipal defendant to rebut th[e] prima facie case.”).  In other 
words, a showing of discriminatory effects satisfies plaintiff’s burden of production. See 
supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Arlington Heights II, 558 F.2d at 1288 (“[T]he Village’s action . . . had the effect 
of perpetuating segregation in Arlington Heights.”). 
 173. See id. at 1290 (“[C]ourts must use their discretion in deciding whether . . . relief 
should be granted.”). 
 174. See id. at 1293–94 (explaining that, should the district court determine on remand 
that no other suitable land existed within Arlington Heights, the Village’s refusal to rezone 
violated the FHA). 
 175. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). 
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of persuasion shifts to the government to prove that its actions did not 
violate the FHA.176
The town of Huntington, New York
 
177 rejected Housing Help, Inc.’s 
(HHI) proposal to rezone property on which it wished to construct a multi-
family subsidized apartment complex in a section of Huntington that was 98 
percent white.178  HHI, two black residents of Huntington, and the local 
chapter of the NAACP brought suit alleging that the town’s refusal to 
rezone violated the FHA.179
The Second Circuit began its opinion by noting the broad mandate of the 
FHA’s stated policy goal:  to “provide, within constitutional limitations, for 
fair housing throughout the United States.”
 
180  Like the Seventh Circuit, the 
Second Circuit affirmed that discriminatory intent was not required for an 
FHA violation,181 and found that the plaintiffs had established prima facie 
evidence of discriminatory effects—Huntington’s refusal to amend its 
zoning ordinance had the effect of perpetuating segregation.182
Next, however, the court’s analysis departed from the Seventh Circuit 
framework.  Rather than weighing the Arlington Heights II factors and 
coming to a decision, the court imposed an affirmative burden of persuasion 
on the defendants.
 
183  In order to rebut a prima facie showing, a defendant 
must present “bona fide and legitimate justifications for its action with no 
less discriminatory alternatives available.”184  Although Huntington 
presented seven arguments purporting to justify its actions, the court held 
that the town had not carried its burden, and ordered rezoning of HHI’s 
property.185
 
 176. See id. at 939 (“Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing . . . a defendant 
must present bona fide and legitimate justifications for its action with no less discriminatory 
alternatives available.” (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (1977))). 
 
 177. At the time litigation arose, Huntington’s population was 95 percent white and 3.35 
percent black.  The town, located on Long Island’s north shore, was essentially segregated; 
its black population was concentrated in six census tracts. See id. at 929.  As of the 2010 
Census, Huntington is 93.2 percent white, and 2.2 percent black. See Huntington CDP, New 
York, CENSUS.GOV, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36/3636233.html (last visited Feb. 
23, 2012). 
 178. See Huntington, 844 F.2d at 930–31, 937.  The site on which HHI wished to build 
was zoned exclusively for single family homes. See id. at 931. 
 179. See id. at 928. 
 180. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006)) (noting the widespread racial segregation 
that precipitated enactment of the FHA). 
 181. See id. at 935 (holding that Title VIII encompasses “segregation resulting from the 
application of facially neutral rules”). 
 182. See id. at 938. 
 183. See id. at 939.  The court did note, however, that the Arlington Heights II factors 
could still be relevant to a final determination. See id. at 935 (“[W]e are not persuaded to 
adopt precisely the formulation of the Arlington Heights II factors . . . [they] are to be 
considered in a final determination on the merits rather than as a requirement for a prima 
facie case.”). 
 184. See id. at 939 (citing Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 
1977)). 
 185. See id. at 940–42 (“[W]e find the reasons asserted are entirely insubstantial.”). 
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2.  An Overview of the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
The First Amendment to the Constitution forbids the government from 
enacting any law “prohibiting the free exercise” of religion.186  Prior to 
1990, the Free Exercise Clause was understood to require courts to apply 
strict scrutiny analysis to any laws interfering with the free exercise of 
religion.187  When courts apply strict scrutiny, the burden of persuasion is 
always on the government.188
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith,
 
189 however, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the assumption 
that strict scrutiny applies to all laws impeding the free exercise of 
religion.190  Smith arose when two Native Americans were fired from their 
jobs because they used peyote,191 which Oregon classifies as an illegal 
drug.192  When their applications for unemployment benefits subsequently 
were denied because they had been fired for misconduct—ingesting 
peyote—they brought suit claiming that the denial violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.193
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that strict scrutiny should 
apply,
 
194 and held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt activity 
forbidden by neutral laws of general applicability merely because such 
activity is of a religious nature.195  The practical result of Smith was that 
neutral laws, even those that burden the free exercise of religion, are subject 
to rational basis review.196  In rational basis review, the plaintiff always has 
the burden of persuasion.197
Smith, however, did not result in the death of strict scrutiny for all Free 
Exercise cases.  Three years later, the Court again faced a Free Exercise 
 
 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 187. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 1247–48 (“[I]n 1963, the Court expressly held 
that strict scrutiny should be used in evaluating laws burdening free exercise of 
religion . . . .  For the next 27 years, the Court usually purported to apply strict scrutiny to 
religion clause claims.”). 
 188. See id. at 671; see also supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 189. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 190. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 1259 (“There is no doubt that Smith changed 
the test for the Free Exercise Clause.  Strict scrutiny was abandoned for evaluating laws 
burdening religion.”). 
 191. Peyote is a hallucinogenic drug that is harvested from cacti that grow in Texas and 
northern Mexico, and its use has long been associated with the sacramental rites of the 
Native American Church. See Randy Dotinga, Peyote Won’t Rot Your Brain, WIRED (Nov. 
4, 2005), http://www.wired.com/medtech/health/news/2005/11/69477. 
 192. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (noting that the Oregon State Board of Pharmacy 
classified peyote as a Schedule I drug). 
 193. See id. 
 194. See id. at 885–86 (explaining that cases involving differential treatment based on 
race, where the use of a compelling government interest test is appropriate, are “not remotely 
comparable” to plaintiffs’ peyote use). 
 195. See id. at 878–79 (“We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse 
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to 
regulate.”).  The Oregon law forbade all Peyote use, not just religious use. Id. at 874. 
 196. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 1259 (“[N]eutral laws of general applicability 
only have to meet the rational basis test, no matter how much they burden religion.”). 
 197. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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challenge in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.198  
In Lukumi, members of the Santeria religion challenged a zoning ordinance 
in the city of Hialeah, Florida, which forbade ritual animal sacrifices.199  
The Court unanimously held that the zoning ordinance violated the Free 
Exercise Clause.200
The Court distinguished Smith, explaining that strict scrutiny applied 
because the challenged zoning ordinance was not neutral or generally 
applicable; it was clearly enacted to suppress the practice of Santeria.
 
201  
The ordinance could not survive strict scrutiny because the city could 
employ other means to achieve its purported goals—protecting public 
health and preventing cruelty to animals202—without burdening the 
exercise of Santeria.203  Thus, after Lukumi, non-neutral laws that interfere 
with the free exercise of religion are subject to strict scrutiny.204
Stated alternatively, Smith and Lukumi stand for the proposition that the 
assignment of burdens of proof in Free Exercise claims depends on the 
challenged statute’s neutrality.  If the statute is neutral and generally 
applicable, the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion.  But if a plaintiff 
produces evidence that a non-neutral law interferes with the free exercise of 
his religion, the burden of persuasion shifts to the government. 
 
II.  FROM MIDRASH TO CENTRO FAMILIAR:  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT EMERGES 
This part explains the circuit split that has surfaced in the years since 
RLUIPA was enacted.  Although their standards are not identical, the Third 
Circuit205 and the Seventh Circuit206 both place the burden of persuasion on 
religious institutions challenging land use regulations under the Equal 
Terms Provision.  By contrast, the Ninth207 and Eleventh208
 
 198. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 Circuits have 
 199. See id. at 527 (“[T]he city council adopted three substantive ordinances addressing 
the issue of religious animal sacrifice.”).  Animal sacrifice is one of the primary forms of 
Santeria devotion. Id. at 524. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See id. at 534 (“The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of 
the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances.”). 
 202. See id. at 543 (explaining that the ordinances were underinclusive of their purported 
goals). 
 203. See id. at 544–45. 
 204. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 130, at 1261 (“After Smith and [Lukumi] . . . a law 
that is not neutral or of general applicability would be found unconstitutional unless it met 
strict scrutiny.”). 
 205. See Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 270 
(3d Cir. 2007) (articulating five elements plaintiff must prove to bring a successful claim 
under the Equal Terms Provision); see also infra notes 224–36 and accompanying text. 
 206. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371–73 
(7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that plaintiffs must prove regulation treats them less well than a 
nonreligious comparator that has an equivalent impact in terms of accepted zoning criteria); 
see also infra notes 237–45 and accompanying text. 
 207. See Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1173 
(9th Cir. 2011) (“[B]urden is not on the church . . . but on the city . . . .”); see also infra notes 
250–66 and accompanying text. 
 208. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 
2004) (holding that plaintiffs can shift burden to the government by demonstrating that the 
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held that the burden of persuasion is on the government.209
A.  The Eleventh Circuit Places the Burden of Persuasion 
on Government Defendants 
  This part 
summarizes the holdings and reasoning of each circuit. 
The Eleventh Circuit was the first to interpret RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
Provision,210 and it placed a light burden of production on religious 
plaintiffs, which, when met, shifts the burden of persuasion to the 
government.  This section begins with a brief summary of the facts 
confronted by the Eleventh Circuit in Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of 
Surfside,211
Midrash arose when two Orthodox
 and then examines the reasoning behind the court’s holding. 
212 synagogues near Miami Beach213 
challenged a zoning ordinance that excluded churches and synagogues from 
locations where private clubs were permitted214  The Eleventh Circuit held 
that it violated the Equal Terms Provision.215  The Midrash court noted that 
both the synagogues and the town assumed that the Equal Terms Provision 
only applied when religious assemblies or institutions were treated less than 
equally with similarly situated nonreligious assemblies or institutions.216  
However, the court rejected this assumption, and instead held that if a land 
use regulation treats a religious assembly or institution less than equally 
with any nonreligious assembly or institution, it violates the Equal Terms 
Provision.217  The court explained that because RLUIPA does not define 
“institution” or “assembly,” the terms must be construed by their natural 
meanings.218
Midrash places the burden of production on the religious institution 
challenging the land use regulation:  a plaintiff must prove that (1) it is an 
 
 
regulation treats them differently than any secular assembly or institution); see also infra 
notes 210–23 and accompanying text. 
 209. The Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have also recently considered the Equal Terms 
Provision. See generally Elijah Grp. Inc., v. City of Leon Valley, 643 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 
2011); Third Church of Christ, Scientist of N.Y.C. v. City of New York, 626 F.3d 667 (2d 
Cir. 2010); Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229 
(10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 978 (Jan. 10, 2011).  None of these cases produced 
its own clear test, and although the defendant in Rocky Mountain filed a petition with the 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari challenging RLUIPA’s constitutionality, the Court 
declined to hear the case. See Rocky Mountain, 131 S. Ct. 978; see also Lucero, supra note 
103 (noting the Rocky Mountain defendant’s intention to file a petition for a writ of certiorari 
with the Supreme Court). 
 210. See David M. Finkelstein, The Rhetoric of Originalism, 12 J.L. SOC’Y 42, 58 (2011) 
(noting that the Eleventh Circuit was the first to interpret the Equal Terms Provision). 
 211. 366 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 212. See id. at 1221. 
 213. See id. at 1219.  Surfside is a small town north of Miami Beach comprising about 
one square mile. See id. 
 214. See id. at 1220.  Permitted uses included private clubs and lodge halls. See id. 
 215. See id. at 1219 (“We first hold that the . . . provision excluding churches and 
synagogues . . . violates the Equal Terms provision of RLUIPA.”). 
 216. See id. at 1230 (“The parties assume that [the Equal Terms provision] applies to 
assemblies or institutions that are similarly situated in all relevant respects.”). 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. at 1230. 
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assembly or institution, and (2) the land use regulation gives differential 
treatment to any nonreligious assembly or institution.219
Relying on definitions from both Webster’s Third New International 
Unabridged Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary, the court held that 
synagogues and private clubs both fell within the natural perimeters of 
“assembly” and “institution.”
 
220  Because private clubs were permitted by 
Surfside’s zoning ordinance and synagogues were not, the court held that 
the ordinance violated RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision.221  The court 
then explained that because RLUIPA codifies Lukumi,222 and Lukumi 
requires strict scrutiny analysis, the burden shifted to Surfside to persuade 
the court that there was a compelling government interest that could justify 
violation of the Equal Terms Provision.223
B.  The Third Circuit Places the Burden of Persuasion 
on Religious Plaintiffs 
   
The Third Circuit was the next to consider RLUIPA’s Equal Terms 
Provision, in Lighthouse Institution for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long 
Branch.224
The case arose when the City of Long Branch, New Jersey denied the 
Lighthouse Institute for Evangelism’s proposal to operate a church on its 
property.
  This section reviews the facts of the case, and highlights the 
Third Circuit’s use of Free Exercise jurisprudence as a basis for its decision 
to allocate the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff. 
225  Lighthouse filed suit against Long Branch alleging a violation 
of RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision.226
 
 219. See id. (“[W]e must first evaluate whether an entity qualifies as an ‘assembly or 
institution’ . . . before considering whether the governmental authority treats [it] 
differently.”). 
 
 220. See id. at 1230–31. 
 221. See id. at 1231. 
 222. See id. at 1232; see also supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1232 (“[A] violation of [the Equal Terms Provision], 
consistent with the analysis employed in Lukumi, must undergo strict scrutiny.”).  Although 
some federal courts disagree with the Eleventh Circuit’s view that strict scrutiny applies to 
violations of the Equal Terms Provision, that dispute is outside the scope of this Note.  See 
Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 
2011) (rejecting compelling government interest as an exception to the Equal Terms 
Provision); River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 370–71 
(7th Cir. 2010) (rejecting strict scrutiny for lack of statutory textual support); Lighthouse 
Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 269 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Equal 
Terms provision operates on a strict liability standard.”); infra note 309 and accompanying 
text. 
 224. 510 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 225. See id. at 259.  The city’s Redevelopment Plan forbade the development of property 
without prior approval from the City Council, and churches were not permitted in the zone, 
which the city intended to turn into a vibrant downtown corridor. See id. at 258. 
 226. See id. at 259.  The complaint also alleged violation of the Free Exercise Clause. See 
id.  Prior to Long Branch’s enactment of the Redevelopment Plan, Lighthouse had 
challenged the city’s original zoning ordinance, which also forbade churches from the area; 
after Lighthouse’s development proposal was denied, it amended its original complaint to 
challenge the Redevelopment Plan as well. See id. 
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The District Court granted Long Branch’s motion for summary 
judgment, and the Third Circuit affirmed the order.227  The Third Circuit 
explained its decision by noting that RLUIPA’s purpose was to codify 
existing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence,228 which the court understood 
to require a comparison between religious conduct and analogous secular 
conduct that affects the challenged regulation’s goals in a similar 
fashion.229  Thus, the court held that a land use regulation violates the 
Equal Terms Provision only if it treats nonreligious institutions better than 
religious institutions that are similarly situated with respect to the 
regulatory purpose of the law.230
The court enumerated a five-part test that plaintiffs must satisfy to meet 
their burden of persuasion.  A challenger must prove:  “(1) it is a religious 
assembly or institution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, which 
regulation (3) treats the religious assembly on less than equal terms with (4) 
a nonreligious assembly or institution (5) that causes no lesser harm to the 
interests the regulation seeks to advance.”
 
231  The court assigned this 
burden to the plaintiffs without reference to RLUIPA section 2000cc-
2(b),232 which allocates burdens of proof under the statute.233
In the Third Circuit’s view, Lighthouse did not meet its burden because 
churches and other assemblies permitted by the city’s Redevelopment Plan 
were not similarly situated with respect to the plan’s purpose.
 
234  A New 
Jersey statute prohibited the issuance of liquor licenses in the vicinity of 
churches,235
 
 227. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 277 (“We . . . affirm the District Court’s entry of 
summary judgment.”). 
 and therefore a church would cause more harm to the 
 228. The court qualified its assertion that RLUIPA codifies the Smith-Lukumi line of 
cases by explaining that RLUIPA does not embrace strict scrutiny in Equal Terms cases. See 
id. at 269 (“[W]e find that Congress clearly signaled its intent that the operation of the Equal 
Terms provision not include strict scrutiny by the express language of [the Substantial 
Burden Provision] and [the Equal Terms Provision].”).  The Substantial Burden Provision 
expressly requires strict scrutiny, and the Equal Terms Provision is silent on the issue. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006). 
 229. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 265–66 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. 
v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 
2004); Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002); Fraternal 
Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 230. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 266; see also HAIG, supra note 91, § 110:45 (arguing 
that the Third Circuit’s test is a “more reasoned interpretation” than the Eleventh’s). 
 231. Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 270. 
 232. The court mentions section 2000cc-2(b) earlier in its opinion, but only in the context 
of explaining that proof of a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious exercise is 
unnecessary in an Equal Terms claim. See id. at 263 (“[Section 2000cc-2(b)] merely 
establish[es] that, where substantial burden is an element of the claim, the plaintiff must 
prove it; [it] do[es] not address when substantial burden is such an element.”). 
 233. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Lighthouse, 510 F.3d at 272 (noting a lack of evidence that the Plan “treats a 
religious assembly on less than equal terms with a secular assembly that would cause an 
equivalent negative impact on Long Branch’s regulatory goals”). 
 235. See id. at 270. 
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Redevelopment Plan’s goal of developing a vibrant downtown corridor than 
would other permitted institutions.236
C.  The Seventh Circuit Places the Burden of Persuasion 
on Religious Plaintiffs 
 
Like the Third Circuit, the Seventh Circuit held that RLUIPA’s Equal 
Terms Provision places the burden of persuasion on religious institutions to 
show that the challenged land use regulation treats them less than equally.  
This section explains the reasoning behind the Seventh Circuit’s slight 
variation on the Third Circuit’s Lighthouse test. 
In River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Village of Hazel Crest,237 the 
Seventh Circuit was critical of the tests created by the Eleventh and Third 
Circuits,238 and sought to create its own.239  The court rejected the Midrash 
test on the grounds that it was too friendly to religion, suggesting that the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reading of the Equal Terms Provision might violate the 
Establishment Clause.240  Criticism of the Third Circuit was more 
measured; the Seventh Circuit’s principal critique of the Lighthouse 
standard was its vagueness.241  Judge Richard A. Posner, writing for the 
majority, explained that the Lighthouse test’s reliance on identification of a 
zoning ordinance’s “regulatory purpose” invites speculation, and might help 
zoning authorities cloak discrimination with facially neutral language.242
The Seventh Circuit’s solution was to remove the “regulatory purpose” 
language from the Third Circuit’s test, and replace it with “accepted zoning 
criteria.”
 
243  The court reasoned that where “purpose” is subjective, 
“criteria” is objective, and thus less susceptible to manipulation.244
 
 236. See id. (“[I]t is clear that Long Branch could not create a downtown area where 
restaurants, clubs, bars, retail and entertainment facilities synergize if Long Branch could not 
issue liquor licenses throughout that area.”). 
  Thus, if 
a land use regulation treats religious and nonreligious land uses the same 
 237. 611 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 238. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 370 (“Neither the Third Circuit’s nor the Eleventh 
Circuit’s approach . . . is entirely satisfactory.”); see also HAIG, supra note 91, § 110:45 
(characterizing the Eleventh Circuit’s test as an “overly-expansive interpretation” of the 
Equal Terms Provision). 
 239. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 368 (noting the existence of the circuit split as a factor 
in deciding to hear the case en banc). 
 240. See id. at 370 (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).  The Establishment 
Clause is outside the scope of this Note, and will not be addressed. 
 241. See id. at 371–72. 
 242. See id. (explaining that the “regulatory purpose” test invites self-serving testimony 
by zoning boards and their expert witnesses). 
 243. See id.  Examples of such criteria include the designation of districts, such as a 
commercial or residential district, and zoning goals such as traffic management. See id. at 
373. 
 244. See id. at 372; see also Foley, supra note 18, at 213, 226 (arguing that the Seventh 
Circuit’s test reflects deference to cities’ right to zone for the general welfare of the 
community, and that the test will have limited value outside of the specific facts in River of 
Life). 
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with respect to an established zoning criterion, the Equal Terms Provision is 
satisfied.245
Essentially, the burden of persuasion is on the plaintiff to prove that it 
was treated worse than a secular comparator that had an equivalent negative 
impact on accepted zoning criteria.
 
246  Like the Third Circuit,247 the 
Lighthouse court held that plaintiffs have the burden of persuasion without 
addressing248 RLUIPA section 2000cc-2(b).249
D.  The Ninth Circuit Places the Burden of Persuasion 
on Government Defendants 
 
The Ninth Circuit considered the Equal Terms Provision for the first 
time250 in Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma.251  
The Ninth Circuit adopted a variation on the Seventh Circuit’s “accepted 
zoning criteria” test, but with respect to burdens of proof, its decision is 
most similar to the Eleventh Circuit’s test.252  Like the Eleventh Circuit,253 
the Ninth Circuit places a light burden of production on plaintiffs, which, if 
met, shifts the burden of persuasion to the government.254
 
 245. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 373 (explaining that like treatment with respect to an 
accepted zoning criterion is enough to rebut an Equal Terms claim). 
  This section 
explains how the Ninth Circuit’s literal reading of RLUIPA’s text guided 
the court’s decision. 
 246. See id.  Judge Posner used the example of a movie theater’s effect on traffic to 
demonstrate how the test would work in practice. See id.  A movie theater, like a church, 
generates traffic only at specific times during the day—the two have an equivalent negative 
impact on the goal of reducing traffic. Id.  Thus, a plaintiff that could prove that it was 
excluded while a movie theater was permitted would prevail. Id. 
 247. See supra text accompanying notes 232–33. 
 248. In dissent, Judge Diane S. Sykes acknowledged the burden shifting paradigm 
mandated by section 2000cc-2(b), but Posner’s majority opinion completely ignored it. See 
River of Life, 611 F.3d at 390 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“RLUIPA shifts the burden of 
persuasion to the government once the plaintiff ‘produces prima facie evidence.’” (quoting 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006))). 
 249. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 250. See Robert H. Thomas, 9th Circuit:  Church’s Use Permit Requirement Violates 
RLUIPA Equal Terms, INVERSECONDEMNATION.COM (July 20, 2011), 
http://www.inversecondemnation.com/inversecondemnation/2011/07/9th-circuit-churchs-
use-permit-requirement-rluipa-equal-terms.html (noting that the Equal Terms Provision was 
an issue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit). 
 251. 651 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 252. Cf. Foley, supra note 18, at 194 n.14 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit . . . virtually adopted the 
Third Circuit’s test.”). 
 253. See supra notes 210–23 and accompanying text. 
 254. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 (“The burden is not on the church to show a 
similarly situated secular assembly, but on the city to show that the treatment received by the 
church should not be deemed unequal, where it appears to be unequal on the face of the 
ordinance.” (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006))).  Although they treat the mechanics of 
burden shifting similarly, the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits’ tests are not identical.  The Ninth 
Circuit requires the government to rebut a prima facie case by demonstrating that a 
challenged land use regulation treats religious and nonreligious institutions equally, whereas 
the Eleventh Circuit engages in strict scrutiny analysis; it asks the government to rebut a 
showing of unequal treatment by demonstrating that such treatment is justified by a 
compelling government interest. See supra Part II.A.  Whether strict scrutiny is the 
appropriate analysis is outside the scope of this Note. 
1880 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
Due in large part to a state statute prohibiting the issuance of liquor 
licenses within three hundred feet of a church,255 the City of Yuma, 
Arizona denied Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas’s request for a 
conditional use permit256 to operate a church on its property.257  Centro 
Familiar then sued under the Equal Terms Provision, seeking a declaratory 
judgment invalidating the City Code, an injunction requiring the city to 
issue a conditional use permit, and damages.258
In the Ninth Circuit’s evaluation of Centro Familiar’s claims, it adopted 
the Seventh Circuit’s “accepted zoning criteria” test with one important 
distinction.
 
259  Rather than requiring the church to identify a secular 
comparator, the Centro Familiar court instead held that the plaintiff’s 
burden of production is satisfied by a mere showing that the land use 
regulation appears unequal on its face.260  Once such a showing is made, 
the burden shifts to the city to prove that the church was not being treated 
less than equally with respect to accepted zoning criteria.261
The court explained that RLUIPA’s text expressly places the burden of 
persuasion on the government,
 
262 not the church:  “‘If a plaintiff produces 
prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation of the Free 
Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the 
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the 
claim.’”263
Noting that the City Code expressly excluded religious institutions (while 
permitting nonreligious institutions), the court found that the plaintiff had 
 
 
 255. See also supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text. 
 257. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1166 (noting Centro Familiar’s awareness prior to 
purchasing the property that its application for a conditional use permit might be denied).  
The property was located in Yuma’s Old Town district, in which churches were required to 
obtain conditional use permits to operate, but other membership organizations were 
permitted as of right. See id. 
 258. See id. at 1167.  After Centro Familiar lost the property to foreclosure, the claims for 
the injunction and declaratory judgment were deemed moot, but the claim for damages 
survived. See id. at 1167–68. 
 259. See id. at 1173 (“[A] city violates the Equal Terms provision only when a church is 
treated on a less than equal basis with a secular comparator, similarly situated with respect to 
an accepted zoning criteria.”); see also supra note 243 and accompanying text. 
 260. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1173 (“The burden is . . . on the city to show that 
the treatment received by the church should not be deemed unequal, where it appears to be 
unequal . . . .”). 
 261. See id. 
 262. See id. at 1171. 
 263. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006)).  The Ninth Circuit’s literal reading of 
section 2000cc-2(b) recalls Justice Clarence Thomas’s opinion in Connecticut National Bank 
v. Germain. See 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says . . . .  When the words of a 
statute are unambiguous . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981))).  The court also recognized RLUIPA’s 
interpretive mandate, noting that the Act should be interpreted “in favor of a broad 
protection of religious exercise.” See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1172 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc-3(g)).   
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established a prima facie case.264  The City of Yuma argued that the 
prohibition on the issuance of liquor licenses near churches was an 
acceptable zoning criterion that justified the exclusion of churches, but was 
unable to persuade the court.265  Because the Code excluded religious 
organizations, instead of “uses which would impair the issuance of liquor 
licenses,” the court held that the city was unable to meet its burden, and 
found that the City Code violated RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision.266
III.  GOVERNMENT DEFENDANTS SHOULD HAVE THE BURDEN 
OF PERSUASION IN EQUAL TERMS CASES 
 
This part first assesses the viability of each of the three models 
introduced in Part I.D—the Equal Protection Clause, the federal Fair 
Housing Act, and the Free Exercise Clause—as models for comparison to 
the Equal Terms Provision.  It then addresses considerations of the public 
policy consequences attendant to the allocation of burdens of proof in Equal 
Terms claims.  This Note concludes that considered as a whole, the weight 
of authority suggests that the government should have the burden of 
persuasion in Equal Terms claims. 
A.  The Limited Relevance of Equal Protection Challenges to Equal Terms 
Cases 
Challenges to exclusionary zoning ordinances under the Equal Protection 
Clause appear to be the least persuasive model for comparison with the 
assignment of burdens of proof in RLUIPA Equal Terms cases.  This 
section explains the limitations of Equal Protection challenges as useful 
models for comparison. 
In Equal Protection claims, burdens of proof are necessarily dependent 
on the plaintiff’s identity.267  As demonstrated in Belle Terre268 (and to a 
lesser degree in Cleburne269), whether the plaintiff is a member of a 
“suspect class” can make or break a claim.270  Although this aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence is ordinarily discussed 
using the language of standards of review,271 it is no less intertwined with 
the assignment of burdens of proof.272
 
 264. See Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171 (“It is hard to see how an express exclusion 
of ‘religious organizations’ from uses permitted as of right by other ‘membership 
organizations’ could be other than ‘less than equal terms’ . . . .”). 
 
 265. See id. at 1173 (“[T]he 300-foot restriction on liquor licenses does not vitiate the 
inequality.”). 
 266. See id. at 1173–75.  The Code also required a conditional use permit for schools, 
which likewise impeded the issuance of liquor licenses under Arizona law, but it excluded 
all religious organizations, not just churches, and the liquor license prohibition concerned 
proximity to churches only. See id. 
 267. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 268. See supra notes 144–50 and accompanying text. 
 269. See supra notes 132–41 and accompanying text. 
 270. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 271. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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In an Equal Protection challenge to an exclusionary zoning ordinance, if 
the plaintiff is not a member of a suspect class, the ordinance will be 
presumed valid, and the plaintiff will bear the burden of persuasion.273  If 
the plaintiff is a member of a suspect class that is excluded by the 
ordinance, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the ordinance is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.274
Upon first glance, this framework may initially appear to be quite useful 
for analogizing to Equal Terms claims.  Consider a hypothetical scenario, in 
which a religious plaintiff challenges a zoning ordinance under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  The assumption under established Equal Protection 
framework is that one would need only to determine whether the religious 
organization qualifies as a member of a suspect class, which would then 
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, and by extension, the allocation 
of burdens of proof.  The next step would be to ask how the result of the 
Equal Protection analysis would influence a hypothetical claim brought by 
the same religious organization under RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision. 
 
Unfortunately, the simplicity and consistency of the Equal Protection 
framework collapses in the case of a religious plaintiff.  Religious status has 
proven to be an exception to the “suspect class” model upon which Equal 
Protection analysis is grounded; plaintiffs cannot count on their status as a 
religious organization alone to predict a particular standard of review or 
assignment of burdens of proof.275
The Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence undermines the Equal 
Protection framework for determining burdens of proof.  After the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Smith
 
276 and Lukumi,277 religious status no longer 
guarantees that strict scrutiny analysis (and its attendant placement of the 
burden of persuasion on the government) will apply.  Returning to the 
hypothetical religious plaintiff, Equal Protection analysis will not yield a 
definitive assignment of burdens of proof, and thus there is no resultant 
structure to compare with a similar claim brought under RLUIPA’s Equal 
Terms Provision.  Because the assignment of burdens of proof in Equal 
Protection claims brought by religious plaintiffs is always uncertain, it 
makes little sense to attempt to compare its framework to the Equal Terms 
context.278
B.  The Fair Housing Act Favors the Allocation of the Burden 
of Persuasion to Government Defendants in Equal Terms Cases 
 
This section contends that exclusionary zoning jurisprudence under the 
FHA favors the placement of the burden of persuasion on the government 
in Equal Terms cases, and explains why Huntington, in particular, is a 
persuasive model for comparison. 
 
 273. See supra notes 137–38 and accompanying text. 
 274. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra notes 189–203 and accompanying text. 
 276. See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text. 
 277. See supra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
 278. See supra note 156. 
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Both of the FHA cases discussed in Part I.D.1.b roughly parallel the 
Eleventh and Ninth Circuits’ burden-shifting paradigm.  Under Midrash, a 
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that a land use 
regulation affords differential treatment to a nonreligious institution.279  
Under Centro Familiar, plaintiffs establish a prima facie case if the land use 
regulation appears unequal on its face.280  Under both Arlington Heights 
II281 and Huntington,282 a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by 
demonstrating the discriminatory effects of a land use regulation.  Once a 
prima facie case has been established, both of the Equal Terms tests then 
shift the burden of persuasion to the government.283
While the four-factor analysis that follows a showing of discriminatory 
effects in the Arlington Heights II test has been characterized as an avenue 
“for the municipal defendant to rebut [a] prima facie case,”
  At this point, the 
comparison with the FHA cases becomes a bit muddier. 
284 the court’s 
opinion partially undermines that characterization.  The court does not 
describe the factors as a means for rebuttal, but instead as guiding its own 
ultimate decision.285  Defendants are not required to prove anything, or 
even refute the existence of discriminatory impact.  In this sense, the burden 
of persuasion does not fall squarely on either party; ultimately, whether a 
violation has occurred is a matter of judicial discretion.  In addition, the 
fourth factor, action preventing construction286, is so specific to a particular 
set of facts that it makes little sense to apply it in the typical Equal Terms 
fact pattern, where a religious institution seeks to operate out of a 
preexisting facility.287
Huntington is the more consistent parallel.  Unlike Arlington Heights II, 
it is unequivocal in its allocation of burdens of proof.  Once a plaintiff has 
made a prima facie case, a defendant must present “bona fide and legitimate 
justifications for its action with no less discriminatory alternatives 
available.”
 
288
Although the burden shifting framework is consistent with both Midrash 
and Centro Familiar, the Huntington court’s language is remarkably similar 
to the Ninth Circuit’s explanation of the Centro Familiar defendant’s 
 
 
 279. See supra note 219 and accompanying text. 
 280. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.  The Midrash standard has also been 
described using the language of facial inequality. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 281. See supra notes 168–71 and accompanying text. 
 282. See supra notes 178–82 and accompanying text. 
 283. See supra notes 222–12, 253–54 and accompanying text. 
 284. See supra notes 171, 173 and accompanying text. 
 285. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 286. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 287. The plaintiffs in Midrash challenged a zoning ordinance which prohibited the 
operation of synagogues that were already extant. See supra notes 212–14 and 
accompanying text.  The plaintiff in Lighthouse brought suit when the city denied its 
proposal to operate a church from a building it already occupied. See supra note 225 and 
accompanying text.  The plaintiff in Centro Familiar was denied a conditional use permit to 
operate a church from a building it had just purchased. See supra note 257 and 
accompanying text. 
 288. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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failure to meet its burden to prove that the ordinance did not treat Centro 
Familiar less than equally.  The proffered justification for the exclusion of 
churches—a statutory prohibition of the issuance of liquor licenses near 
churches—was legitimate, but there was a less discriminatory alternative:  
instead of religious organizations, the ordinance could have excluded uses 
impairing the issuance of liquor licenses.289
It is also noteworthy that the Huntington court referenced the FHA’s 
policy goal of providing fair housing to the extent possible under the 
Constitution in explaining its decision.
 
290  The court’s decision can be 
understood as a manifestation of that policy goal; placing the burden of 
persuasion on the government makes it easier for plaintiffs to prevail,291
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Centro Familiar references 
section 2000cc-3(g) of RLUIPA,
 
and thus in theory increases the availability of fair housing. 
292 which states that the Act should be 
interpreted “in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the 
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.”293
FHA case law suggests that governments defending exclusionary zoning 
ordinances under the Act should have the burden of persuasion.  Although 
the Arlington Heights II test’s usefulness for comparative purposes is 
limited by its ambiguity and fact-specific inquiry,
  The court’s 
decision recognizes RLUIPA’s interpretive mandate; placing the burden of 
persuasion on the government adds another layer of protection to the 
exercise of religion. 
294 the Huntington case 
provides a compelling parallel to Equal Terms cases, and both favor the 
placement of the burden of persuasion on the government.295  If land use 
regulations that make distinctions based on religion are viewed as examples 
of exclusionary zoning, and if persons similarly situated should be treated 
alike by the government,296
C.  Free Exercise Jurisprudence Favors the Allocation of the Burden 
of Persuasion to Government Defendants in RLUIPA Equal Terms Cases 
 the FHA framework favors allocation of the 
burden of persuasion to the government in RLUIPA Equal Terms cases. 
This section begins by recounting the influence of Free Exercise 
jurisprudence on RLUIPA, and then explaining why that influence favors 
placing the burden of persuasion on the government in Equal Terms claims.  
It then argues that the Third and Seventh Circuits’ justification for departing 
from Free Exercise framework is undermined by RLUIPA’s clear statutory 
 
 289. See supra notes 265–66 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
 291. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 292. See supra note 274.   
 293. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (2006). 
 294. See supra text accompanying notes 284–94. 
 295. But see supra notes 284–88 and accompanying text (explaining that although both 
Huntington and Arlington Heights II favor placing the burden of persuasion with the 
government, the Arlington Heights II burden shifting paradigm is less concrete). 
 296. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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text, which commands allocation of the burden of persuasion to the 
government. 
Burdens of proof in Free Exercise claims are dependent upon the nature 
of the challenged law.297  As the Supreme Court held in Smith and Lukumi, 
neutral laws of general applicability will receive rational basis review, 
wherein the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion.298  In contrast, non-
neutral laws that make distinctions between secular and religious activities 
are subject to strict scrutiny,299 where the burden of persuasion rests with 
the government.300  There is ample evidence that Congress intended 
RLUIPA to codify the holdings of Smith and Lukumi.301
The Eleventh,
  If that is the case, 
it would follow that if a land use regulation is non-neutral—if it excludes 
religious organizations but allows secular organizations, or if it requires a 
conditional use permit for churches, but allows secular institutions to 
operate as of right—the burden of persuasion should be on the government. 
302 Third,303 and Seventh304 Circuits understood RLUIPA 
to codify the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise jurisprudence as articulated in 
the Smith and Lukumi decisions.  And yet, when confronted by challenges 
to such laws, the Third305 and Seventh306
The Third Circuit explained this apparent incongruity by asserting that 
congressional intent to codify Smith and Lukumi was not absolute.
 Circuits placed the burden of 
persuasion on the religious plaintiff. 
307  In the 
court’s view, the fact that the Equal Terms Provision makes no mention of 
strict scrutiny, while the Substantial Burden Provision expressly requires it, 
signals congressional intent to take strict scrutiny off the table in Equal 
Terms cases, Smith and Lukumi notwithstanding.308
While this argument might have merit,
 
309 it also ignores the text of 
section 2000cc-2(b), which expressly requires the government to bear the 
burden of persuasion in Equal Terms cases.310  It is telling that the Third311
 
 297. See supra note 
 
204 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 302. See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 304. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is silent as to whether RLUIPA codifies Free Exercise 
jurisprudence, but its adoption of a variant on the Third Circuit’s test can be understood as 
an endorsement of that view. See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 308. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 309. Whether strict scrutiny analysis is appropriate in Equal Terms claims has been 
widely discussed elsewhere. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 87, at 1104 (arguing that 
applying strict scrutiny contravenes congressional intent); Terry M. Crist III, Comment, 
Equally Confused:  Construing RLUIPA’s Equal Terms Provision, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1139, 
1155 (2009) (endorsing the Eleventh Circuit’s strict scrutiny standard based on RLUIPA’s 
intent and purpose); Minervini, supra note 92, at 606–07 (arguing that together, RLUIPA’s 
text and purpose support a strict scrutiny approach). 
 310. Section 2000cc-2(b) reads:  
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and Seventh312
If statutory silence on the issue of strict scrutiny in Equal Terms cases 
implies that Congress intended to foreclose such analysis from judicial 
purview, as the Third Circuit contends, then surely the express statutory 
allocation of burdens of proof in Equal Terms cases must also foreclose 
judicial discretion.  Even if Congress meant to remove Lukumi’s strict 
scrutiny requirement from the Equal Terms Provision, by including section 
2000cc-2(b) in RLUIPA, it clearly intended to retain Lukumi’s implicit 
requirement that the burden of persuasion must fall on the government.  
Indeed, the statutory language unambiguously requires it.
 Circuits did not even attempt to claim otherwise, because no 
other interpretation of section 2000cc-2(b) is plausible. 
313  As the 
Supreme Court has noted in Connecticut National Bank v. Germain,314 
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says. . . .  When the words of a statute are 
unambiguous . . . ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’”315
Regardless of congressional intent, the result should still be the same.  If 
RLUIPA completely codifies Lukumi, strict scrutiny applies, and thus the 
burden is on the government.  If RLUIPA codifies Lukumi with the 
exception that strict scrutiny does not apply to the Equal Terms Provision, 
section 2000cc-2(b) nevertheless keeps the burden on the government—
instead of justifying a violation, the government instead has to prove that 
one has not occurred.  Thus, as both a jurisprudential model for comparison, 
and a source of legislative history, the Free Exercise Clause suggests that in 
RLUIPA Equal Terms cases, the government must bear the burden of 
persuasion. 
 
D.  Public Policy Considerations Favor the Allocation of the Burden 
of Persuasion to Government Defendants in RLUIPA Equal Terms Cases 
Interpretations of RLUIPA should be informed by public policy 
considerations.  First, the public policy of the United States favors the free 
exercise of religion.316  Second, and related, is RLUIPA’s goal of 
protecting religious exercise to the maximum extent permitted by the Act 
and the Constitution.317
 
If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim alleging a violation 
of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the 
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, 
except that the plaintiff shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law 
(including a regulation) or government practice that is challenged by the claim 
substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.  
  Third, RLUIPA’s legislative history demonstrates 
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006); see also supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra text accompanying notes 247–49. 
 313. See supra notes 112–16 and accompanying text. 
 314. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 315. Id. (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); see supra note 263 
and accompanying text. 
 316. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
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congressional concern with protecting minority and unpopular religions.318
In order to realize the policy of protecting the free exercise of religion, to 
the extent that it is possible to read the Equal Terms Provision as affording 
religious exercise greater protection, courts should do so.  RLUIPA 
allocates the burden of persuasion to government defendants in Equal 
Terms cases.
  
Finally, consistent procedure in challenges to all forms of exclusionary 
zoning is desirable from a public policy perspective.  All of these policy 
considerations favor the allocation of the burden of persuasion to the 
government in Equal Terms cases. 
319  This interpretation better protects the free exercise of 
religion than does placing the burden on religious plaintiffs because, 
generally speaking, it is more difficult for the party charged with the burden 
of persuasion to prevail.320
The policy of protecting minority and unpopular religions is also better 
served by reading RLUIPA to charge the government with the burden of 
persuasion.  Such religions, Islam in particular, are often faced with 
obstacles unrelated to land use law,
 
321 and may have limited funds with 
which to litigate.322
While the vulnerability of minority and unpopular religions was 
undoubtedly one of RLUIPA’s motivations,
  The additional obstacle of carrying the burden of 
persuasion only serves to make it more difficult for members of such 
religions to freely exercise their faith—a direct conflict with the policy of 
protecting the free exercise of minority and unpopular religions. 
323 is not limited to such 
religious institutions.  Protecting religious exercise to the extent possible 
under the Constitution324
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that those similarly 
situated should be treated alike by the government.
 means protecting all religions equally; thus, 
although RLUIPA’s allocation of the burden of persuasion to the 
government in Equal Terms claims may be a byproduct of concern for the 
minority, it applies to challenges brought by all religious institutions. 
325  Accordingly, policy 
should favor equal treatment for all plaintiffs challenging exclusionary 
zoning policies.  Nonreligious exclusionary zoning jurisprudence under the 
FHA generally places the burden of persuasion on government 
defendants;326
 
 318. See supra notes 
 and the same burden should apply to challenges to 
exclusionary zoning ordinances brought under the Equal Terms Provision. 
101–07 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 116, 223, 261 and accompanying text. 
 320. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 321. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 322. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 323. See supra notes 101–04 and accompanying text. 
 324. See supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text. 
 325. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 326. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
RLUIPA and its Equal Terms Provision reflect the foundational 
American principle of religious freedom.  Exclusionary zoning practices 
threaten that ideal.  Governments engaged in nonreligious exclusionary 
zoning carry the burden of persuasion when they are challenged.  
Governments accused of violating citizens’ rights to freely exercise their 
religion are charged with a similar burden.  These examples, coupled with a 
policy-sensitive reading of RLUIPA’s text, leave only one appropriate 
solution to the Equal Terms circuit split:  government defendants must bear 
the burden of persuasion in Equal Terms cases. 
Congress could have chosen to place the burden of persuasion on 
plaintiffs in Equal Terms cases, but chose to put the burden on the 
government instead.  Given that burdens of proof are extremely important 
to the outcome of any case, that choice appears to be wise.  The Eleventh 
and Ninth Circuits recognized the wisdom of Congress’s choice, and should 
the Supreme Court hear an Equal Terms case, it should do the same. 
 
 
